E pluribus Plura or e Pluribus Unum?

Cultural Pluralism and Social Class in Lebanon

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Introduction: Pluralism and Social Class

Pluralism as a concept was not really applied to the pre-industrial or pre-colonial societies of Asia. Orientalists analyzing the social structure of Ottoman society did not conceptualize the existence of Christian millets and dissident Muslim minorities in pluralist terms. Rather, orientalists and their intellectual heirs commonly used the metaphor of a “mosaic” to describe Ottoman or Arab social structure. Arguably, the mosaic metaphor implies pluralism in the sense of a multiplicity of communities co-existing side-by-side with some institutional parallelism, but it is a static concept suggesting neither the inter-relationships existing between the varied groups nor their making up an integrated dynamic whole.

While concepts of ethnic and racial pluralism have informed western sociological studies, pluralism in political theory has played a much stronger role in interpreting democratic politics. According to this theory, democratic society is differentiated into a number of groupings—such as racial, ethnic and religious groups, occupational and educational categories, large communities and regional segments—each of which share various material and expressive interests. These are the groups which enable individuals to organize, plan and coordinate political action in pursuit of their collective interest and to check potential threats from other groups as well as the central government.

Social and economic policy in pluralist democracies is formed as a consequence of compromises worked out between contending organizations or associations (parties) representing respective groups so that every contender receives some share and is not left out. Other moderating mechanisms in the political process are the multiple involvements and commitments of individuals. Multiple involvements generate cross-cutting loyalties and the overlapping sharing of benefits which restrain individuals from extreme demands or feelings of severe threat.

Pluralism in its social, cultural and political meaning is a theoretical construct which obviously emphasizes vertical divisions of society, itself an organic structure. Pluralism ignores horizontal divisions, that is, divisions of social class. The concept of social class derives from a whole different theoretical tradition. Introduced in the seminal works of Karl Marks, the concept of social class is anchored in analysis of the political economy of a society: that is, its modes of production and social formation. The classical definition of social class is in relation to the means of production. The class structure is in flux and certain classes are on the rise while others are in eclipse or are disappearing. In periods of rapid, disaggregated social transformation from one mode of production to another, the societal practices are dislocated and class conflict is aggravated.

The interplay of vertical and horizontal cleavages, of sect and class in Lebanon, in a period of rapid economic transformation produced, I believe, sect-classes which emerged differentiated, unevenly stratified, polarized and antagonistic. This in the context of the intervention of external factors led to serious and nearly unbridgeable social–political fissures which, I believe, are behind the incredibly uncivil war. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the nature of the relationship between sect and class in modern Lebanon, and how uneven economic development produced sect-classes which became both unevenly differentiated, stratified and antagonistic.
Dimensions of Pluralism in Lebanon

Cultural pluralism

Typically, cultural pluralism implies the peaceful co-existence of groups—mutual toleration, perhaps even mutual admiration, although the latter is more of an ideal than an empirical reality. This aspect was celebrated by Lebanese (sectarian) ideologues as strength of Lebanon and the civilized basis of its democracy, that is, until the savage civil war exposed it as more an illusion than reality. Cultural pluralism refers to the co-existence of different patterns and ways of behavior. What is the scope of the cultural differences, if any among the sects in Lebanon?

Despite the admitted significance of sectarianism and sectarian social structure in Lebanon, it is surprising to find very few studies directly addressing the social, cultural and psychological differences, if any, between the sects and the bases of their reproduction. In other words, hardly any studies considered the weight of sect differences as a factor in the reproduction of sectarianism as a socio-political system in the country. In studies of Lebanon, sects and sectarianism are used more often as explanatory concepts (independent variables) than phenomena themselves to be explained.

Let us here briefly review the sectarian differences in cultural terms: values of hospitality, generosity, courtesy, familism, honor and so on, do not really differ among the sects. Christians as a whole are no less committed to these values than Muslims or Druze. There are no specific studies which address this question directly, but a review of the anthropological and sociological literature on Lebanon—village studies of the different communities—reveals a strong similarity in the commitment of the people of varied sects to these classical values. Family and kin care are seen by Christian and Muslim university students as the focus of primary loyalty over sect, religion, party and nation. T.Farah finds differences between Christians and what he calls “non-Christians,” presumably Muslims, in regard to some political attitudes. In his study Muslims disagreed with supporting the separation of church and state twice as often as Christians, and 68.7 percent of the Muslims in his study agreed with the statement that there ought to be a change in Lebanon’s political system.

A more recent study by H.Barakat on university student politics reveals in general that vertical loyalties, to family and religious community, were stronger than horizontal class loyalties. Nevertheless, Barakat found a positive correlation between religious affiliation and students’ self-perception of their own political tendencies. Muslim students were much more likely to identify themselves as leftist than Christian students, with Shi’a the most likely to do so; Muslim students also identified themselves as part of the Arab nation much more than Christian students, among whom the Maronites were the least likely to claim such identity.

Modernization, the dominant American theoretical formulation for analyzing social change in the Third World, has frequently been applied to Lebanon. L. Armstrong and R. Bashshur investigated modern value orientation in rural Lebanon. Using a constructed scale of pro-modern western values, they found a tendency for modern value orientations to be positively related to occupation, education, religion and rural or urban residence. The sample was not large enough to disaggregate the respective influence of each factor. They discovered an “interplay between ecological and religious factors affecting values.”

Systematic differences in child rearing, values and future personality structure were found by E. Prothro in a study of child rearing in Lebanon. Christian parents, more than Muslims, tented to reward good behavior and use less violence as a means of punishment. As a result, Prothro found that Christian children were more apt to become achievers and less likely to develop authoritarian personalities. The statistical evidence for these differences disappears with higher education.

Daniel Lerner, in his famous study on the passing of traditional society in the Middle East, identified Lebanon
as the most modernized of the six states he studied. The Lebanese were most free from “Arab-Muslim traditionalism” and were the most “facile empathizers.” Although he acknowledged the role of sectarianism, sectarian education and the Christians—Western connection, lerner did not test his sample for systematic differences among sects or between Christians and Muslims. In short, while the classic cultural values seem equally strong among the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, commitment to modern value orientation is not. Christians are ahead of the Muslims on this score; and yet Barakat reports that it is Muslim students rather than Christian ones who support more radical social, economic and political change in the country. On the surface, these findings seem contradictory. Either they tap different phenomena, or they indicate confusion in the validity and meaning of such scales and their relation to socio-political outlooks.

Values may be extrapolated from behavior patterns. Sectarian or religious differences in behavior patterns do exist and are relatively well documented. The Lebanese demographer Joseph Chamie has summarized some of these behavioral findings. These are based on a 1971 sub-sample of a Lebanon Family Planning Association (LFPA) study investigating fertility and family-planning pattern in Lebanon. According to the study, the average age at marriage for Muslims is lower than that for Christians, whereas there is little, if any, difference in the wife’s average number of years married. Endogamous marriages are higher among Muslims than Christians. F.Khuri reports similar large differences between Muslims (principally Shi’a), among whom 37.8 percent of the old urbanites and 38.6 percent of the migrants marry kinsmen, and Christians (principally Maronites) of whom 16.1 percent of urbanites and 20.4 percent of the migrants marry kinsmen. On the other hand, more Christians than Muslims marry exogamously outside of the sect while the proportion married outside of their religion (faith) is extremely low among all. Chamie also reports significant fertility differences among the sects. The Shi’a have the highest fertility rates, while the Druze have the lowest. Western fertility rates, although they differ among the different Christian sects, are definitely much lower than those of Muslims; excluding the Druze. This confirms an earlier study on fertility differences in Lebanon by D.Yaukey.

Anthropologists often identify cultural items which are peculiar to an ethnic group or subculture. Such items often function as “boundary markers” identifying a person as a member of the group and distinguishing him or her from the others. Such “markers” include clothing, language, vocabulary, dialect, ceremony, rituals, names, gestures, “body language,” rites of passage and even funeral notices, as J.Gulick notes. Language is of course one of the most important bases for ethnic group formation. Lebanon does have two important communities whose language is not Arabic: Armenians and Kurds, the first Christian and the latter Muslim. The socio-political role of the Kurds has been marginal, while the Armenians have played a much more important role in the economic life of the country. None the less, we shall not address these two cases in any detail. More relevant here are differences in dialect, vocabulary and idiom among the six major sects or between the two major religious groups. Lebanese do recognize relatively distinctive Shi’a, Druze, urban Sunni and Maronite mountain peasant dialects. Parenthetically, the Arabic dialect spoken by the nearly half million Palestinians resident in Lebanon is clearly identifiable. Certain words and idioms also distinguish the Arabic spoken by the different sectarian groups. At the minimum they include those cognates used to refer to religious or sectarian ceremonies, but they are not restricted to that. Some greetings and other usages differ by sect.

As important as dialects is the issue of bilingualism in Lebanon. Selim Abou, a Lebanese Jesuit priest and social anthropologist, argues that French is as much part of Lebanon as Arabic, making Lebanon bilingual and thus bi-cultural. However, while bilingualism, whether French-Arabic or, more recently English-Arabic, is common among the upper and professional classes of all sects in Lebanon, French-Arabic bilingualism—perhaps more accurately, the use of some French in everyday speech—is more typical of the Christian
Maronite sect than all other sects in Lebanon. Nevertheless, bilingualism is an additional distinguishing mark of the sectarian groups no less important than dialect.

The French-Arabic bilingualism of which Abou speaks hides a stronger difference in cultural identity. This is not the place to investigate the sharp ideological differences of identity in Lebanon. Suffice it to say that for Abou and other “Lebanese nationalist” ideologues such as Michel Chiha, Sa’id “Aql and others, Lebanon has a special personality, a special identity, a special destiny to represent and join East and West, a personality, identity and destiny distinctly not Arab. For these Lebanese, Lebanon is the “national home” of the Christians, and they often express their ideas in essays or literature written in French. This idea of Lebanon was born among the Maronite Christians and is very much at odds with the concept of Lebanon as Arab—part of the Arab umma or nation—which is held strongly by the Muslim sects as well as by most Greek Orthodox Christians, and to a lesser extent by the Greek Catholics. As in the socio-economic differences by sect, Christians are less distinguishable from each other than Muslims of different sects. The dialect, the use of vocabulary and idioms, mark their sectarian speakers in a subtle manner.

This is less true of the religious and/or sectarian rituals and ceremonies which are important acts of group differentiation. The Christian holidays of Christmas, Easter, Palm Sunday and the many saints’ days have a seasonal rhythm, style and ritual that are quite different from the Muslim “Id al-Adha, “Id al-Fitr, and Mawlid al-Nabi as well as that of “Ashura for the Shi’a. Christians much more than Muslims exhibit pictorial, statuary and other symbolism. Such symbols and celebratory events bring sect members—through family and kin—closer together, reinforce their mutual heritage and emphasize their separateness from other religions or sects. Similarly, the unsynchronized seasonal rhythm, the differing ceremonies, rituals and meanings also lessen the impact of national (religiously legitimized) civic-cultural celebrations which could bring the whole nation together. For example, Shamms al-Nasim in Egypt is a spring celebration which unites Christian Copts and Muslims, rather than reinforcing their divisions.

Distinctive traditional clothing, a more visible “marker,” still distinguishes the Lebanese sects. While such distinctive clothing has been rapidly disappearing in favour of European-style clothing for both men and women, rural dwellers and recent migrants to Beirut still exhibit clothing, in whole or in part, which betrays their sectarian identity. The distinctive clothing of the various clerics also reinforces differences and divisions. Just as significant as the visible “markers” are names. Both given names and family names—many but not all—are easily distinguishable as specifically religious if not sectarian. In conclusion, it should be clear that subtle and visible “markers” encourage sectarian and religious group identification, reinforce differences and simultaneously help to reproduce sectarianism.

- Where are the Dabki dancers?
- Where is Mahmud? (a Sunni name)
- Where is Ma’ruf? (a Druze name)
- Where is Ilyas? (a Christian name)
- Where is Husayn? (a Shi’a name)

Surnames or family names are also easily distinguishable as specifically religious if not sectarian.
Social pluralism

Social pluralism refers to societies which are “segmented into corporate groups” whose “social structure is compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions.” These institutions typically are duplicatory and culturally similar. It should be clear, however, that not all institutions of a pluralist society are segmented and duplicatory. Socially, in pluralist societies, different groups participate together in one or two institutions, the economy and the government, but otherwise maintain separate institutions. Relative economic interdependence or integration and political (governmental) “collaboration” draw the different groups together while in all other areas separate institutions keep them apart. Such societies are complex, and the dynamics of centripetal, integrative forces versus centrifugal, disintegrative ones may generate potentially volatile social change and conflict. Lebanon is such a society.

Lebanese religious sects are sometimes depicted as corporate groups. The most readily identifiable aspects of the corporate character of Lebanese religious sects is their legal powers. Sectarian ecclesiastical courts are autonomous from the state, but their rules and decisions are enforced by the state. Sectarian courts basically regulate family law—“personal status” laws in the legal idiom of Lebanon: marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, adoption, etc.—reinforcing the legitimacy of the clergy and the church and the autonomous corporate sectarian structure.

This corporate sectarian structure and the relative self-isolation of the varied religious communities may be illustrated in most areas of social life. Let us begin with the geographic distribution of sectarian communities. Maronites are concentrated in Mount Lebanon, whereas the Druze are in the Shuf district of the southern part of the same mountain range. Shi’a Muslims are concentrated in Lebanon, Mount "Amil, and in the northern Baqa’ Valley and the northern plain of “Akkar but are principally resident in the major coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. The Greek Orthodox are concentrated in the Kura district of northern Lebanon and to a lesser extent in the southern Baqa’ and in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli. Greek Catholics, a much smaller community, are found in and around the Baqa’ city of Zahlah and sprinkled in the southern part of Mount Lebanon.

Rural-to-urban migration has been quite extensive since the Second World War and its subsequent economic transformations. Rural migrants congregated in urban districts with their sectarian co-religionists, or established whole new neighborhoods. Beirut, for example, has become a microcosm of Lebanon as Armenians, Christians, Palestinian refugees (both Muslims and Christians), Syrian immigrants, Maronites, Shi’a and Druze emigrants have joined Beirut’s original Sunni and Greek Orthodox inhabitants. Based on a 1970 study of Beirut by the Lebanese Salwa Nassar Foundation, D. Gordon reports the following: “68.7 percent of the Armenians are congregated in a single area, around Beirut river, 70 percent of the Sunnis live in the central area, in and around the Basta, and 74.2 percent of the Maronites live in Ashrafiyya, in East Beirut, and in “Ayn al-Rummana.” In the southern district of Beirut, the Shi’a pre-dominate. S. Nasr reports that 85 percent of the residents of Burj al-Barajna and 78 percent of Ghubayri are Shi’a, as is 49.5 percent of Burj Hammud in the suburbs of northeastern Beirut. Maronites in the eastern suburbs make up 55 percent of Harat Hrayk, 53.5 percent of Shiyyah, 47 percent of Furn al-Shubbak and 49 percent of Sinn al-Fil. In short, residential congregation of varied sectarian communities has been maintained even in the face of the significant economic and occupational change of the last two generations.

Sectarian residential distribution is both an expression of and a factor in reinforcing other sectarian institutions. Health services, whether clinics or hospitals, are strongly sectarian. For example, the Maqasid Hospital and
the Barbir Hospital, both major medical centers, are Muslim (Sunni), while others such as the Hotel Dieu hospital and many others in the central mountains, including Dayr al-Salib (Monastery of the Cross), are medical facilities catering to the Christian communities. French and Italian Catholic missionary hospitals and orphanages with medical sections are also located in largely Christian areas and serve a Christian, principally Catholic, clientele. The two teaching hospitals – that of the American University of Beirut and Université Saint Joseph Hospital – serve generally more mixed clients, the former more so than the latter. Governmental hospitals and clinics, however, serve the poorer classes, which tend to be Muslim – Sunni and Shi’a. It is quite well recognized that the government medical facilities deliver poor quality services, especially in contrast to the university, sectarian and missionary hospitals, as well as those which are private and non-sectarian. Private non-sectarian hospitals and clinics nonetheless reinforce sectarian structure, as they are situated among and are owned and operated by co-sectarians or co-religionists.

The education system in Lebanon is perhaps of greatest relevance to both cultural and social pluralism in the country. Mass education or modern schooling began in earnest in the eighteen century among the Maronites, instigated by French missionaries. The basic foundation for sectarian education was thus laid. Private non-church schools, increasingly organized since independence, are sectarian in location, staff, student body, context of education and often the idiom of instruction – French for Christians and Arabic for Muslims. After independence, the government embarked upon a policy of expanding the state educational system. This targeted the rural underdeveloped areas and the poor urban areas lacking in private schooling. Hence, state schools at practically all levels served principally the Muslims, especially the Shi’a. In 1960, two-thirds of the elementary school pupils in public schools were Muslims (27 percent Sunni, 27 percent Shi’a and 11 percent Druze). Similarly, in secondary public schools, 62 percent were Muslims (40 percent Sunni, 18 percent Shi’a and 4 percent Druze). Conversely, of the 126,482 pupils attending Catholic schools in 1967-8, 76 percent were catholic (Maronite, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic) and a large majority of the 17,830 students attending Sunni Maqasid schools in 1965 were Sunni Muslims.27

This relatively strong sectarian segregation in pre-university education continues into the university. Christian students educated in the French language enter the French Saint Joseph University in Beirut or go to France for higher education. Eighty-five percent of the Saint Joseph students are Christians, while over 90 percent of the students of the Beirut ARAB University (Arabic-language instruction) are Muslim. At the Lebanese (state) university 54 percent of the students are Christians, and in 1973, 56 percent of the students at the American University of Beirut (English-language instruction) were Christians28.

From the above, it should be clear that education is one of the strongest sectarian (and by extension, missionary) activities. The quantity, level and quality of education indicate a strong Christian advantage over Muslims, especially the Shi’a. The school system also reinforces French – Arabic bilingualism and bi-culturalism among Christians, particularly the Maronites, and helps alienate them from the regionally dominant Arab culture and its Islamic underpinnings. Schools and education in modern societies are the most significant socialization agencies which transmit cultural heritage, values and ideology of a society. A unified and uniform system of education acts as a universal solvent, integrating the future citizens of a country into one civic culture. Lebanon’s educational system, fragmented in terms of structure, curriculum, language of instruction and cultural emphasis, acts against the socio-political integration of the society; reinforces duplicatory sectarianism, foreign linkage and dependence; and reproduces sectarian disadvantages and the sect-class structure.
As in health services and education, philanthropy in Lebanon is also sect-based. While no overall study of philanthropy in Lebanon exists, there is fragmentary evidence to back up this assertion. According to Gulick, Tripoli has hardly any non-sectarian benevolent organizations, even among the local branches of the international organizations. The sectarian connection is clear enough in terms of administration funding and clientele. The above facts indicate a main theme: duplicatory sectarian institutions not only continued but increased with independence.

This section on sectarian duplicatory, parallel institutions should not end without reference to another set of institutions joining more dynamically, in a mutual reinforcing manner, the formal and informal aspects of sectarian relations. These are cultural, athletic, youth and prayer group and auxiliary church-related fraternities and sororities, social and community clubs and all other voluntary associations. They are numerous, but empirical data concerning them do not exist. Typically such associations are community based or institutionally related and thus sectarian. They bring together co-sectarians or co-religionists, reinforcing their sectarian identity, world view, ideology and social solidarity.

It was shown above how the intersection of informal and formal structures mutually reinforces sectarianism. This is not restricted to voluntary associations. Indeed, kinship, peer and friendship groups, patron-client and employer-employee relations and the socialization process are all interlocked with sect and sectarianism. Not only are all these social aspects structured along sectarian lines, they are also mutually reinforcing.

Briefly, the functionally extended family system in modern Lebanon is intimately intertwined with sect institutions. Family and sect sustain each other as institutions, not least in relation to socialization of the children in the family and church, in sectarian schools, in after-school activities and youth groups, in providing the locus and parameters for peer friendships and in reinforcing family values, identity and solidarity. These informal and basic social relations give substance and solidity to the sect as a political group through which people intermarry, make friends, visit, work, participate socially and co-operate politically. By contrast, relationships between people of different sects tend to be segmental, utilitarian and non-affective.

From the above review, it should be clear that the institutional structure of Lebanon is indeed parallel and duplicatory among the sects, and that these duplicious formal and informal institutions are the backbone of the segmented corporate structure of sects. Financial resources for the functioning of the institutions are raised internally within the sect or church, from Lebanese state subsidy and externally from western governments and institutions (for Christians) and from regional Arab sources (for Muslims). Thus, even the institutional resource base is separate, duplicatory and autonomous. One further aspect of the strength of sectarian institutions is the absence of secular alternatives. Since there are really no secular alternatives, and the state itself is unwilling or unable to build competitive centralized institutions – rather, it is active in sustaining the sectarian institutions – sectarian institutions flourish and act as serious obstacles to the integration of Lebanese society.

Furthermore, institutional development in each sect is uneven. Given the long and continuing external linkage with France and the West, the longer history of development, the greater the availability of resources and the apparently higher skill levels of leadership, the Christian sects in general and the institutions (both qualitatively and quantitatively) compared to those of the Muslim sects, particularly the Shi’a. This has been an important factor in Christian power in Lebanon and in the stratified sect-class structure of the country. The relative institutional advantage of the Christian sects corresponds to the relative socio-economic advantage of the
Christian community as a whole. The strong institutions which have helped bond the Christian community in its privileged status are weaker among Muslims. In part this is responsible for the relative strength of loyalty of the Christians populace to their established leadership and parties. Conversely, neither the weaker and less developed institutions of the Muslims nor the long established structures of patron-client relationships could hold back the revolt of the dispossessed Muslims (especially the Shi’a) against both their own traditional leadership (zu’ama’) and privileged Christian power.

Political Pluralism

Lebanon has been hailed as the most modern and democratic state in the Arab world, albeit a precarious one. Various scholars have implicitly or explicitly hypothesized the following factors as those underlying the (pre-civil war) democratic nature of Lebanon, albeit all have been seen as “deficient”: (capitalist) economic growth, westernization and pluralism. Political pluralism responsible for a liberal democracy depends on a society differentiated into relatively autonomous and organizes communities or constituencies, each of which shares expressive and material interests, and on such constituencies representing multiple centers of power, none wholly sovereign. In Lebanon, the religious sects are such communities, and sectarianism appears on the surface to fit the requirements of political pluralism. What is lacking in Lebanon, however, is the pattern of individual involvement and commitment in multiple organizations across the constituent groups (sects) which produces cross-cutting and overlapping loyalties and acts as a moderating influence politically and a liberalizing tolerance socially.

Cross-sect organizations do exist in the country. Trade unions and syndicated, secular culture, sports and social organizations as well as political secular parties draw Lebanese off all sects as members. At the start of the civil war, for example, there were over 125 trade unions with a total membership of about 50,000 representing 15 percent of the labor force. These unions were organized into several labor federations, the largest of which was the Confederation of Lebanese Labor (CLL) consisting of 67 unions and 28,000 members. Twenty-five of the 125 unions were white-collar unions, 30 were joint blue-collar unions and 70 were workers’ union. S. Khalaf reports that many of the unions were “house unions” while others included both employers and employee in the same organization:

- The CLL has…failed so far as a catalytic agent in intensifying the development of labor consciousness and working-class solidarity … [Specifically, it] was virtually under complete control of pro-government politicians, and has remained since politically conservative with almost no inclination to challenge the prevailing political and economic framework.

Thus, these occupations-based cross-sect unions – or the labor movement in general – “has not been of an agency of national and political change.” Organizational fragmentation, personal rivalries and opportunism among union leaders, leaders with strictly apolitical ideology, a contradictory mix of constituencies in unions and the existence of employer-controlled “house unions” have all been factors which inhibited the potential for cross-sect labor (class) consciousness to develop.

Two other objective conditions have contributed to inhibiting the development of labor consciousness. The first has been the work situation of workers. At the beginning of the 1970s, 51 percent of the industrial labor force worked in plants employing more than 50 workers. Such plants comprised only seven percent of the total number of plants with five or more workers. This does not include the thousands of workshops employing fewer than five workers. The overwhelming majority of blue-collar industrial workers in Lebanon were
employed in these small, family-owned workshops. In other words, Lebanese industrial workers labored in highly dispersed, small, often family-owned industrial workshops which were often sect-homogeneous. The second condition inhibiting labor consciousness has been the trade union practice of protecting the privileges of its members against other sectors of the working class in the context of the urban labor surplus of the 1960s and early 1970s before the era of massive migration to the oil-rich Gulf states. This divisive practice was a major obstacle to labor solidarity and occupation-based consciousness. For both privileged and unprivileged workers, a patron-client relationship often pad off better than union members.

In short, while here and there strong secular and militant unions existed (and continue to exist) under the leadership of secular parties (e.g. the Communist Party of Lebanon, or CPL), the overall labor movement was no real challenge to the more entrenched sectarian structure. In general, cross-sect organizations have recently been fragmented and ineffective, especially as they have been undermined by patron-client relationships which are essentially sectarian. Typically, the individual has belonged to multiple sectarian organizations. Multiple memberships have thus functioned to strengthen sectarian loyalty rather than weaken it, and the moderating politics of compromise between the multiple constituent groups typical of western liberal democracies functioned in Lebanon to strengthen sectarianism.

Sectarian leaders (zu’ama”) “bargain” and “compromise” on behalf of their sectarian constituents to the exclusion of secular leadership representing class or occupationally-based multi-sect constituencies. Additionally, parliamentary deputies have been elected from mostly sect-homogeneous electoral districts. The voting laws force a rural migrant to return to his rural electoral district to vote, despite the fact that he has been an urban resident for most of his life. The electoral and voting laws and the sectarian basis of electoral districts encourage the election of sectarian zu’ama’ who express the interests of sect and clan rather than the class-based interests of their constituents. Thus, demands for change and reform have often taken the form of disadvantaged sects demanding a greater “share of the pie” from the more advantaged sects. This then set against sect even though the basis of the demand tended to be socio-economic issues. Ironically, the dynamics of Lebanon’s pluralist political system have tended to discourage cross-sect loyalties in favor of strong sectarian commitments. Instead of moderating cross-cutting and overlapping loyalties, the dynamics of political pluralism have encouraged sectarian polarization.

The rapid socio-economic, class and occupational transformation that overtook Lebanon after the Second World War dislocated many laborers, who began to experience deterioration in their material and psychological wellbeing. This triggered increasing strikes, demonstrations and labor violence in the first half of the 1970s. Labor unrest was only one aspect of social-political ferment; numerous secular and class-based political organizations also sprang up. For a long time Lebanon has had secular political parties, the earliest being the CPL, established in the early 1920s. However, like other Arab communist parties, the CPL never developed a popular appeal and remained marginal until the post-Second World War era and the civil war. Among others, most notably the National Syrian Social Party (NSSP, originally the Parti Populaire Syrien, PPS), was founded in Lebanon and called for the unity of Greater Syria and the unity of all its peoples – Muslims, Christians, Druze, Alawis and others – free from foreign domination and control. As nationalists committed to Greater Syria, they were especially hostile to the more narrow Lebanese nationalism of the (Maronite Christian) Phalangist Party, which has been a de facto sectarian movement in modern form. In the 1940s the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was organized by a prominent Druze leader, Kamal Junblat, but though it attracted many intellectuals from other sects, it remained largely based in the Druze community.
Beginning in the 1950s, Lebanon, like other Arab countries, experienced the rapid spread of secular Arab nationalism. Many parties and groups – most prominently the Ba’th Party, the Nasirites and the Movement of Arab Nationalists – emerged and engaged in feverish intellectual and organizational activities. Nearly all were secularist in ideology and opposed western intervention in the area, while advocating the Palestinian cause, economic nationalism and social reform. Fractious, small and competitive, however, these groups were never able to coalesce into one powerful movement which could challenge the sectarian socio-political structure or sectarian leadership. They only managed to organize themselves in the mid-1970s under an umbrella political coalition – the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). During the civil war, the LNM hammered out a secular, reformist and nationalist political platform which it offered as an alternative to the ossified sectarian structure of antebellum Lebanon. With leadership and cadres from all the sects and classes of Lebanon, the LNM represented the secular, nationalist and democratic center-left groups in opposition to the more (homogeneous Christian) sectarian center-right platforms and groups. This was the basic political lineup whose opposing groups engaged in vicious fighting during the civil war.

The LNM formed a political and military alliance with the PLO.39 As a result of the Israeli assault of 1982 and the exit of the PLO from Beirut, the LNM collapsed militarily and politically. It was replaced by a more clearly sectarian (and factional) opposition to the newly installed Phalangist government – Amal, the principal Shi’a organization, along with the Druze PSP, in an uneasy alliance with the more traditional Sunni leadership and their varied groups. Although the role of the secular parties has not ended, it has again been marginalized.40 In short, the LNM was too fragmented and too disorganized to mount a serious challenge to the sectarian warlords. Secular parties were far too small and fractious and emerged far too late to halt the slide into sect-class conflict.

Sects and the political organizations to which they gave birth are separate and unequal in Lebanon. We have reviewed above how sect differences are organized and reproduced. But sects as sect-classes in modern Lebanon did not emerge full blown. They emerged in a complex historical process involving the impact of global and regional developments over the last 150 years. The origin of Lebanon’s sect system antedates the Ottoman Empire. It was anchored in the Arab-Islamic concept of local Christians as dhimmi, protected communities. The Ottomans then formalized the status of Christian communities as tax-paying millets. Ottoman millets, which were basically tax categories and juridical institutions of protected Christian communities, became mobilized over the years for the organization of labor, production, marketing and local politics. How these sectarian categories became organized sectarian groups in Lebanon is directly related to the impact of European expansion in the Ottoman domains. Western penetration, I contend, was the root cause of the process of uneven sectarian differentiation and the manner in which the differences became organized, stratified and politicized. In other words, modern sectarianism (and Christian political power) is the product of uneven economic development and not he consequence of the attitudinal survival of archaic primordial ties.41 The point id that the greater the sectarian fusion with class and the greater the antagonism of the resulting sect-classes.

Eastern economic penetration and class transformation

Above we analyzed the nature, scope and structures of the sectarian aspect of Lebanon. This system is not merely a stratified mosaic but rather comprised antagonistic social groups which possess relative coherence and differential solidity internally but which together constitute a brittle social formation. Here I will address the “class” part of the sect-class structure. The basic question is: how did social class transformation contribute to the development of sects as sect-classes and to antagonism among them?
Modern classes emerged in the course of change from the nineteen century system of *iqta* “feudalism” into contemporary market economy. My thesis is that the Lebanese class structure came to be laced with sectarian content and vice versa in the course of the social, economic and political convulsions which accompanied the decomposition of Lebanese feudalism and the integration of the country into the western market economy. Lebanon experienced two intense periods of western penetration. The first was in the middle of the nineteenth century at the hands of the French and the second occurred after the Second World War, principally by the United States. The following analysis will concentrate on the consequences of these two periods, the derivative social class transformations and their linkage to sects.

**The Nineteenth Century**

European economic expansion into the Near East began in the earnest after the Ottoman Empire was challenged from within by Egypt. In 1830, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Egypt's strong ruler Mohammad Ali, conquered Greater Syria and directly threatened the Ottoman sultan. During his 10 year rule, Ibrahim Pasha, supported by the ruler of Mount Lebanon, Amir Bashir II, initiated numerous administrative, tax and other changes.

In sum, these changes meant economic liberalization as well as the centralization of power and privilege in the hands of the amir, the vassal of Ibrahim Pasha, to the disadvantage of the heretofore powerful *iqta* 'feudal lords, or *muqati’jis* who in central Mount Lebanon consisted principally of Druze shaykhs. In the course of his struggle with the shaykhs, Amir Bashir systematically confiscated their lands and often forced then and some of their more loyal peasants to flee the area. In turn the encouraged Maronite Christian peasants from the northern parts of Mount Lebanon to take over those lands from both Druze peasantry and shaykhs. Some of these Druze landholdings also found their way into the hands of Christian monasteries, merchants and others. Accordingly, the Maronite peasantry, merchants and church benefited at the expenses of the defeated Druze. In addition, the amir also dismantled some of the *iqta* restraints and somewhat relieved the heavy burden of taxation on the peasantry. These benefits were in large part behind the political support the coalescing Maronite community gave to Amir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha. The Druze, on the other hand, resisted in alliance with the Ottoman overlords. Hence a political divide of Maronites/Egyptians against the Druze/Ottomans was set in motion. With the defeat of Ibrahim Pasha in 1840 and the return of the Ottoman control to Mount Lebanon, leading in 1840-41 to the first sectarian armed conflict, Druze against Maronites.

The restructuring of Mount Lebanon in the wake of the Egyptian defeat, the exile of Amir Bashir, and the violent sectarian conflict set the stage for further strife, both sectarian and class-based. France quickly replaced Mohammad Ali’s Egypt as the ally and protector of the Maronites. A new French/Maronite alliance now confronted the Druze/Muslim/Ottoman axis. The Christians in general and the Maronites in particular hitched their interests to the rising star of a Christian European (capitalist) power, while the Druze and Muslims of the coast remained in alliance with the Muslim Ottoman (mercantile and feudal) empire. Thus, the embryo of the contemporary socio-political divide in Lebanon was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, as was the system of sectarianism upon which it was built.

The socio-political divide was not merely political or social in initial content. Its economic underpinnings were highly developed and of longer history, beginning with European commercial expansion into the Arab East in the sixteenth century via a series of trade agreements known collectively as the Capitulations. Among the privileges the Capitulations agreements provided to European powers were extra-territorial juridical rights
in Ottoman territory. The Capitulations’ rights of protection became progressively extended to local Arab Christians who were collaborating with the Europeans. They were also the basis for the politicization of the religious (sectarian) communities in the Arab East.

Economic historians have reported steady and in some instances dramatic increases in European trade with the Arab Mashriq. While imports tended to be manufactured goods, exports were primarily agricultural products including commercial ones such as silk. Mount Lebanon peasant households increasingly came to produce raw silk as a commercial product for export sale. Estimates suggest that about half the total number of families in Mount Lebanon owed their livelihood to silk as a cash crop. Along with increasing wage of work in silk-spinning factories and tax payments in cash, the turn to cash crops introduced capitalist relations of production which replaced the old *iqta’* arrangements.

The European protection and favoritism accorded to Christian merchants, usurers, brokers, intermediaries, the church and even peasants gave them a distinct advantage over their Druze and Muslim counterparts. For example, only three out of a total 29 Beirut merchants houses trading directly with England were Muslims; the rest were Christian. A shift in wealth and power to the advantage of the Christians was taking place as a Christian mercantile bourgeoisie was rapidly prospering and becoming more powerful politically. This trend was further solidified and distinguished by social-cultural developments. Extensive missionary (especially French) educational, philanthropic and cultural activities among Christians produced western-oriented social institutions and encouraged a cultural schism between the two major religious communities.

This developing sectarian polarization was accompanied by a more strictly class-based conflict which cut across communal lines but which nevertheless turned viciously sectarian. In 1858 a peasant revolt over taxes, landownership and other feudal obligations broke out in the Maronite district of Kisrwan in central Mount Lebanon. It quickly spread, also into areas controlled by Druze lords. There it pitted Maronite peasants against Druze lords. Aided by Christians merchants interested in ending feudal constraints on trade and finance and by the church, this class-based revolt turned quickly into a sectarian war between Maronites and Druze and in general between Christians and Muslims. The Europeans powers intervened anew and helped institute a new political and economic order in the region. Mount Lebanon was rid of formal “feudal” privileges and was economically opened, and a Christian governor, assisted by a council of twelve chosen on a sectarian basis, was appointed.

In short, capitalist relations of production in the sense of monetary relations, cash crop agricultural specialization, urban and rural wage labor, and contractual landlord/peasant relations took root rapidly in the Christian districts but lagged behind elsewhere. This placed Lebanon on a firm basis of foreign-linked capitalist development and sectarianism simultaneously. Class transformations became interlocked with sectarian linkages and the sect-classes were born. This further solidified the Maronites/Christian connection to France. Thus, instead of dissipating communal identity, class transformations in interaction with sects gave rise to sect-classes which reinforced the basic socio-political divide: Christian/West on one side confronting the Druze/Muslims/Ottomans (later Arab states) on the other. By the end of the First World War the Arab Ottoman domains were balkanized and Lebanon emerged as an independent state under a French mandate. Under the mandate system sectarianism was formalized politically and legally and encouraged socially.
Post-Second World War Class Structure

The polarization and solidification of sect-classes in Lebanon received much greater reinforcement in the second major period of western penetration of Lebanon and the region: the post-war oil period.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, western economic expansion into Lebanon and the Arab Mashriq intensified. The discovery of oil and certain political developments in the region – the destruction of Palestine and the rise of radical Arab nationalism in Egypt, Syria and Iraq – allowed a more thorough economic penetration in Lebanon, where it created even greater uneven development. My thesis is that this process also increased the fusion of class with sect, solidified the sect-class structure, and deepened its contradictions. In as much as this is true, it was the root cause of the social upheaval that was quickly to turn again into civil war. External influences and the Palestinian factor exacerbated the internal social contradictions.

In this period, Lebanon emerged as the entrepôt of western commerce in the Middle East, mediating and facilitating the circulation of commodities, capital and labor. After the destruction of Palestine, all of its regional economic functions were transferred to Lebanon: oil terminals as well as banking, port, professional and other services. Radical nationalism in the neighboring Arab states caused the flight of a segment of their respective commercial, industrial and financial bourgeoisie to Lebanon, where it was quickly integrated.

But both of these developments were further energized by the gathering oil boom and its impact on the regional economy through expanding commodity, labor and money market.

Lebanon's economy experienced a phenomenal growth in the tertiary sector of services linking the Mashriq to the West. By the early 1970s, the tertiary sector contributed over 70 percent of the GNP of Lebanon. Western financial firms made up 75 percent of the total foreign institutions in Beirut. The nearly complete control by western finance of Lebanon's banking system funneled capital surplus out of the country, exported investment credits and allowed the commercial sector twice as many credits as all of the productive sectors of the country.

Mercantile capital not only grew considerably by 1975, the year of the civil war, but it also became concentrated in a handful of trading houses. They controlled local credit of banks and usurers in regard to industrial investment. Lebanese merchants have had a profound impact on the restructuring and development of the productive sectors of agriculture and industry. During the post-Second World War period Lebanon's agriculture made another quantum leap to commercial production of cash crop for export, this time to the Arabian Peninsula. Fruit, especially apples and citrus products, replaced cereals and other produce for local use. Mass-produced poultry also became a major export product; originally produced by hundreds of privately-owned small enterprises, it came to be concentrated in a handful of firms dominated by a single giant. Finally, the production of tobacco in the south and sugar beets in the Bïqa' Valley grew dramatically, increasing several-fold between the end of the Second World War and 1975. However, cigarette and sugar beet importers blocked, through state intervention, the development of processing plants and other facilities, thus hurting the small farmer, especially the southern Shi'a and eastern Sunni Muslims.

Important agriculture areas, particularly along the coastal plain and in the Bïqa' Valley, were turned into modern latifundia (plantations), with the release of the sharecroppers and the hiring of a very small fraction of them along with Syrian immigrants and Palestinian refugees, as agriculture in wage labor. Merchant-latifundista owners or partners in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Zahlah were both Christian and Muslim. While the Muslim-populated plains were turned into latifundia, much of the Christian and Druze mountain lands remained
small family farms. These fruit and olive producers often supplemented their income with a second job or other activity but gave up quite a bit of their potential income to merchants for the supplies and marketing of such products. Nevertheless, Christian and Druze mountain “family farmers” tended to be better off than the Shi’a and Sunni peasants. Additionally, those with land in the central mountain districts near Beirut benefited as well from the phenomenal rise in summer rentals, real estate prices and small summer resort businesses. They had multiple sources of income and therefore did not belong to any one occupational group or social class.

The socio-economic effects of these rural developments meant the forced migration, proletarianization and pauperization of some of the Lebanese peasantry. As late as the mid-1960s, two-thirds of the country’s labor force worked in the productive agriculture and industrial sectors – nearly 50 percent in agriculture – but generated no more than 30 percent of the GNP. Rural per capita income was $166 per year, while that of the urban elite was $3,680. Indebtedness of the peasantry increased considerably, as did the number of peasants holding second jobs.

Table 6.1, showing more recent data, indicates significant income level differentials by occupation and sect. It is quite clear from this table that: with whatever reasonable criterion one wishes to employ – such as education, occupation, female labor participation, income, movie attendance, membership in associations – the socioeconomic differentials which merge between the religious groups are unmistakably clear: non-Catholic Christians and Catholic at the top, Druze around the middle, Sunnis near the bottom, and Shi’a at the very bottom.
### TABLE 6.1: Educational status of wife and husband, average family income, husband’s occupation and wife’s work experience before and after marriage, by religious group: Lebanon, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Non-Catholic Christian</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shi’a</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>All groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wife’s education:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of years completed</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent no schooling</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband’s education:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of years completed</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent no schooling</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent less than LL 1,500 per annum</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband’s occupation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/technical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/managerial</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army/police/guard</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts/operatives</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peddlers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of wives who worked:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before marriage</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After marriage</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(no.)**</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *In 1971, one US dollar was equal to 3 Lebanese pounds (LL). **Number of individual interviewed.
As noted in the table, the average number of years of schooling of Christians as well as Druze is far above the national average of 3.6 years, while Sunni wives average 3.3 years and Shi'a wives 1.6. Seventy percent of Shi'a wives had no schooling at all, about twice the national average of 40 percent for married woman 15 to 49 years of age.

Income levels between the religious sects also show dramatic differences. The average family income in 1971 was LL7,143 for the Christians, LL6,180 for the Druze, LL5,571 for the Sunnis and LL4,532 for the Shi'a. Alternatively, the proportion of families earning less than LL1,500 per annum was 7 percent for the Christians, 22 percent for the Shi'a, 15 percent for the Sunnis, and 11 percent for the Druze. Furthermore, in all occupational categories except one (farming) the mean annual income of the Christians is distinctly higher than that of the Muslim sects, with the Druze, as usual, falling in the middle.

Table 6.1 also demonstrates the occupational distribution by sect. While slightly more complex, there is a pattern of Christian sects falling more in the upper occupational categories of professional/technical, business/managerial, clerical and crafts than in the lower category of labor, peddling and others. C. Dubar and S. Nasr report a similar occupational distribution. Among the salaried wage labor in the large industrial establishments of the eastern suburbs of Beirut, 75.7 percent of the Muslims, in contrast to 46.2 percent of the Christians, were unskilled workers, while 11.8 percent of the Muslims, compared to 21 percent of the Christians, were skilled workers. Among the Muslims, only 7.8 percent were professionals and technicians and 4.7 percent were "white-collar" clericals, in contrast to 13.1 percent and 19.7 percent respectively among the Christians.

From the above socio-economic data two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that considerable demographic, social and economic differentiation exists between the populations of the two religions and among the Islamic sects, but not among the Christians. The intra-Muslim variation is large, with the Shi'a placing in the lowest socio-economic status of the six major sects in Lebanon. The second clear-cut conclusion is that Muslims in general are substantially more disadvantaged in socio-economic terms than Christians. These significant socio-economic differences between sects suggest the fusion of class with sect in Lebanon, generating sect-classes.

Forced migration of the Lebanese peasantry was caused only by structural agricultural change, but also by persistent Israeli bombing and Israel’s “scorched earth policy” in southern Lebanon. Government figures show that nearly 49 percent of the Lebanese labor force was in agriculture in 1959, while less than 19 percent continued to be in the 1970s. In other words, in a ten year period, 30 percent of Lebanon’s labor force, composed of tens of thousands of families, had become displaced peasants residing in and around the cities, especially in Beirut. The 1972 Manpower Survey of the Lebanese government shows that 32.1 percent of the rural residents of South Lebanon had migrated to urban centers, as had 19.5 percent of those of Mount Lebanon, 16 percent of those of North Lebanon, and 18.6 percent of those of the Biqa'.

By early 1975, 40 percent of Lebanon’s entire rural population, including 50 percent of the rural population of the Biqa’s [sic] and 65 percent of that of South Lebanon, had been driven out of their homes and off their land.

These displaced peasants tended overwhelmingly to the Shi’as and Sunni Muslims. In Beirut and other cities, only a fraction of them found permanent employment in industry or the service sector. Lebanese
industry suffered from the same blockage that the agrarian sector had; it could not absorb the large influx of displaced peasants survived in shanty towns around Beirut in what came to be called “the belt of misery.” In short, while the Sunni and Shi'a peasantry from the South, North and East (and to a lesser extent the peasantry of the other sects) became either proletariat or subproletariat, the majority of the maronite, Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox Christians became petite bourgeoisie. They used their established political and educational advantage to become functionaries, clerks, managers, professionals, rentiers, small cash crop farmers and small businessmen (with multiple income) servicing the expanding foreign-linked tertiary sectors. They also became craftsmen at higher rates than Muslims. As a result, the rapid class transformations of the 1960s and 1970s differentiated and stratified the sects internally but also solidified the class-sect fusion. Instead of assimilating the different workers into one national culture, the process of uneven development contributed to uneven differentiation and stratification of the sects and to sect-class differences.

The vertical cleavages of sect failed to dissolve in face of the rapid development of horizontal class cleavages in the country. They survived in large part because of the uneven intra-sect patterns of differentiation, the strong sectarian institutions and weak occupational organizations. These socio-economic divisions were the foundation upon which political dynamics developed. Indeed, the emerging socio-economic divide corresponded to the long-established political divide and thus reinforced the level of antagonism. It is no wonder that the politically mobilized groups were eager for the civil conflict which broke out so dramatically and explosively in 1975.

Conclusion

Contrary to the conventional assumption of pluralism which proposes the co-existence of different social groups in one society, the sectarian groups of Lebanon have had a long and complex history of peaceful co-existence alternating with conflict and civil violence. Tolerance and co-existence as well as conflict are obviously not permanent qualities of pluralist societies but are consequences of historical factors which promote such conditions, as this paper has shown.

The Impact of uneven western economic penetration on the *iqta* “feudalism” in Lebanon produced conditions which politicized the sects. The cultural, economic and political institutions that French colonialism introduced, encouraged and later formalized during mandatory rule, reinforced the differences between the sects and widened the social gap. Specifically, the French political arrangements of giving political power to one sect, the Christian Maronites, locked in place not merely the inter-sect cultural differences and differential socio-economic advantages, but also the *political* conditions for sectarian antagonism.

The second wave of western economic expansion into Lebanon was not only more thorough, it was also more severely uneven, interlocking more strongly social class issues with sectarian differences. This economic process differentiated and stratified the sects unevenly. It produced sect-classes and triggered both inter-sect and intra-sect conflicts as well as commensurate sectarian and cross-sect secular political parties.

The uneven impact fell more heavily on the Shi'a and Sunni communities, whose traditional leadership lost legitimacy and control of the dispossessed and urbanized peasants and urban masses as their economic interests increasingly contradicted those of their co-sectarians and their ability to provide patronage was overwhelmed. This contrasted with the Christian leadership whose economic and sectarian interests remained largely identical. In turn, both sectarian leaderships were threatened by new, vocal secular and class-
based leadership. The secular nationalist, liberal and leftist political groups which emerged in Lebanon in consequence of the dramatic transformations struggled simultaneously on two fronts: against sectarianism as a socio-political system (and thus against sectarian groups) and against laissez-tout-faire capitalism (and thus the bourgeoisie and its local and international allies). Sectarianism and laissez-tout-faire capitalism were the two faces of an economically, socially and politically interlocked system, as were the classes which benefited from it. Thus any call for social justice would take on sectarian meaning and would quickly turn into a sectarian socio-political confrontation (with regional and international dimensions) instead of a class conflict, the long civil war and external interventions have reasserted sectarian identities and loyalties. The sectarian parties, militias and leadership, supported by one external power or another, have re-emerged in a formal government to try to broker a new political solution to the tragic civil war. Lebanon may re-emerge in one united whole some day, but it will be with sectarianism in a new form, itself a structural societal faultline which will be the seed of future conflict. The internationalization of the Lebanese conflict has further submerged the social class issue which energized the civil conflict. Lebanon has a long way to go before it can ascend from an antagonistic structure of E Pluribus Plura to a harmonious E Pluribus Unum.

Notes

1. This is not to say that such minorities and their socio-economic role were not studied. See Albert Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (Oxford University Press, London, 1947).


10. T. Farah, *Aspects of Consociationalism and Modernization: Lebanon as an Exploratory Test Case* (Middle East Research Group, Lincoln, NE, 1975), pp.1814-.

11. H. Barakat, *Lebanon in Strife* (University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1977), pp.5978-.


14. D. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (The Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1958), pp.169213-, M.C. Hudson, *The Precarious republic* (Random House, New York, 1968) uses Karl Deutsch’s indices of modernization; population mobility, mass media audience, literacy, occupational change from agriculture, urbanization, etc. and finds a significant advance for the country as compared to others in the Third World including the Arab World.


17. In “Religious Groups,” p.180, Chamie notes: “There are significant fertility differences among Muslim sects and among Christian sects in Lebanon. Therefore, to speak of Muslim-Christian fertility differences is misleading: when considering Lebanese religious fertility differentials, sect must be taken into account.”


23. P. van den Berghe, *Race and Racism* (wiley, New York, 1967), p.34. See also his *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT, 1965)


29. S.K. Farsoun, “Family structure and society in modern Lebanon,” in L. Sweet (ed.), *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East* (Natural History Press, Garden City, NY, 1970), vol.2, pp.257307-


32. S.K. Farsoun, “Working Class Consciousness in Lebanon: Sources and Limitations” (paper delivered at the annual conference of the Middle East Studies Association, Denver, CO, 1971)


34. Khalaf, “Labor Unions,” p.117


36. Ibid


40. However, a coalition of these groups alongside Amal has emerged as the principal resistant to the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon. What their future impact on Lebanese politics will be remains to be seen.

41. See S. Khalaf’s interpretation of the nineteenth-century history of Lebanon emphasizing the survival and continuity of primordial ties, *Persistence and Change in 19th Century Lebanon* (American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1979)


45. Of course this line-up cannot be taken too literally. Not every single Christian was in the Christian/West coalition nor every Muslim in the opposing one. The internal differentiation of the varied sects would prevent that. The line-up as noted here is a general tendency.

46. Farsoun and Wingerter, Palestinians in Lebanon

47. Sinan, F.E. Waqi‘ al-iqtisad al-Lubnani wa tatawwurih (Dar al-Amal, Beirut, 1979), pp.1416-


49. Besoins et possibilités, p.93. See Farsoun and Carroll, “Civil War,” p.20. For a dissenting view, see Iliya Harik, “The Economic and Social Factors in the Lebanese Crisis,” Journal of Arab Affairs vol.1, no.2 (April, 1982), pp.20944-


52. Ibid, p.183


56. Between 1970 and 1975, Lebanese industry did experience a period of rapid growth. The share of industry’s contribution to the GNP jumped to 20 percent. Nevertheless, the rate of increase in industrial employment was only a fraction of that.