TOWARDS A MORE SECURE AND STABLE LEBANON: 
PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

AUTHORED BY
EMILE EL-HOKAYEM AND ELENA MCGOVERN

FEBRUARY 2008
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**CONFERENCE SUMMARY**

*Introduction*

Lebanon is going through a critical period of its history. The security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 2005, the campaign of political violence and assassinations of leading public figures, the continued presence of armed militias operating from Lebanon outside the authority of the state and supported by external actors, and the recent war between Lebanon and Israel emphasize the necessity and importance of rebuilding Lebanon’s security sector to address challenges that could fatally threaten stability in Lebanon and its neighborhood. Most recently, the battle opposing the Lebanese Army to jihadi fighters in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared illustrated both the potential of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a stabilizing actor and the structural challenges it suffers from: an overstretched force, poor managerial and strategic skills at the top, inadequate equipment and training, poor coordination among security agencies and perennial concerns about force cohesion.

The Lebanese security sector is in a period of great flux, with little breathing space to engage in thorough and rigorous thinking about its needs and organization. Its leadership is under stress because of the treacherous politics of Lebanon and the enormous demands that have been put on the force. Unhealthy civil-military relations compound the lack of defense and budget planning. And the discussion about a new national security strategy that would reorganize the security sector never took off because of profound political differences.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese government is already in the process of implementing important security reforms. The government has focused on removing the remnants of Syrian influence, upgrading the capabilities of the security services, professionalizing the officer corps and ensuring greater civilian control of the military. Importantly, LAF units have been deployed in Southern Lebanon following the 2006 war after an absence of almost 30 years. But this progress is gravely hindered by the ongoing political crisis,
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which illustrates the limits of any approach that ignores the differing threat perceptions and alliances of Lebanese groups, as well as enduring interference by outside actors who see defense and security reform as a threat to their interests.

The international community has also taken steps to improve Lebanon’s security environment. Lebanon’s military and internal security forces are receiving much-needed assistance, training and equipment from both Western and Arab states. The United Nations has beefed-up its peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon and had strengthened its mandate, which primarily includes assisting the Lebanese government in establishing its sole authority on Lebanese territory and in enforcing United Nations resolutions 1559 and 1701. The roles and fates of UNIFIL and the LAF are intimately intertwined. As the ability of the Lebanese security sector to assert the authority of the central government in Southern Lebanon grows, the international community hopes to reduce UNIFIL’s role and size. At the same time, UNIFIL is not mandated to assist in building up the capabilities of the LAF, leaving this task to other actors, including Western countries.

Foreign security assistance to Lebanon is growing rapidly. The Nahr el-Bared battle demonstrated the extent to which Lebanon is dependent on foreign assistance to conduct military operations. Other crises, including the wave of political assassinations, have prompted increased aid to internal security agencies. Foreign assistance is also driven by the desire to enhance the perception of a competent and capable Lebanese security sector as a way to diminish the reliance on armed non-state actors.

Limitations to foreign assistance are many. The policy of Qualitative Military Edge in favor of Israel constrains the type and amount of assistance Lebanon can obtain from the United States, as do the ever-present fear of the collapse of the security sector and associated risk of seeing weapons systems falling into the hands of warring parties. Foreign assistance is also hindered by the absence of Lebanese national security and defense strategies, and therefore of coherent procurement and training policies.
All is not dark for Lebanon. The image of the LAF as the only functioning national institution, in contrast with most other institutions, is strengthening. Since 2005, the military leadership has demonstrated pragmatism, restraint and sensitivity in dealing with considerable political challenges. The prestige of the LAF was further elevated during and after the Nahr el-Bared battle. And in Southern Lebanon, the population warmly welcomed the return of the LAF.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese people project on the LAF their hope for a unified country and efficient state, which sometimes leads to an inflated pride in what the LAF really is and what it can do. The security sector reflects the political and societal choices, contradictions and weaknesses of the Lebanese society. This reality cannot be put aside when assessing and assisting the state of Lebanese security.

On December 13, 2007, the Henry L. Stimson Center organized a seminar to evaluate the Lebanese security sector and examine the prospects for defense and security reform. The seminar brought together US, European, UN and Lebanese government and non-government policymakers and experts with direct expertise and involvement in Lebanese affairs. The seminar offered an opportunity for a candid and in-depth discussion under strict Chatham House rules (off-the-record, closed-door debate).

What follows is the conference report based on this discussion. The participants to the seminar have not been asked to approve the content of this report and therefore do not necessarily endorse its analysis and judgments.
**Overview of the security situation in Lebanon**

Since Lebanon regained its independence in 2005, the Lebanese security sector has been tested by three major events: the March 8 and March 14 demonstrations in 2005, the July 2006 war with Israel, and the events of Nahr el-Bared, as well as the continuing campaign of political assassinations and the effects of political instability.

**Demonstrations and street politics since 2005**

The assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri on February 14, 2005 was followed by several months of peaceful protests, including two massive demonstrations on March 8 and March 14 of that year. A major factor in their non-violent nature was the guarded position of the military leadership, which resisted the then-leadership’s order to crackdown on protesters and thus avoided alienating a large segment of the population. Under Syrian suzerainty, the Lebanese military was used as an instrument of domestic control but demonstrated in 2005 surprising independence and did not resort to force to end political contestation. The demonstrations required the Lebanese army to undertake a mission of crowd control for which it was ill prepared but performed well because both sides consciously avoided confrontation. Instances of soldiers allowing protesters to go through checkpoints are numerous, as are those of protesters cheering soldiers.

The 2005 demonstrations were followed in December 2006 by a sit-in in downtown Beirut, close to the governmental palace and other state institutions. The security forces were once again tasked with preventing protesters from taking over government buildings and protecting the sit-in area from outside provocateurs.

Starting 2007, street politics escalated into numerous instances of violence and rioting that put the security forces in an increasingly difficult position. The opposition called for a general strike in January 2007 and pledged to close key roads and paralyze economic activity despite government orders. Government supporters confronted opposition protesters, leading to armed clashes. The Lebanese army intervened to break up fights but refrained from using force. By not enforcing the government order to keep roads open
and staying true to its motto of not “picking sides,” the Lebanese military prevented what could have escalated into major armed clashes but its reliability came into question.

The Army’s standing was further harmed by the January 2008 clashes with Shia protesters, during which an unclear chain of events led to the Army firing at the protesters and killing 8.

Street politics and the ensuing violence illustrate the limitations and lack of capability of the Lebanese security sector in dealing with mass movements and providing adequate crowd control. The LAF will remain the main security player in dealing with such contingencies because of its size and mobility until the ISF develops adequate internal security capabilities and division of labor is agreed on.

Withdrawal of the Syrian military
The withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005 left a security vacuum that the Lebanese security forces, long prevented from playing a comprehensive security role, struggled to fill. Kept for long as a surrogate to the occupying Syrian forces and an instrument of domestic control and repression, the LAF moved hastily to provide domestic and internal security without clear guidelines and increased capabilities. The ‘stabilizing’ role that Syria played in Lebanon evaporated as non-statutory armed actors such as Hezbollah and Palestinian factions sought to test the LAF and impose a new modus vivendi.

Campaign of political violence
Since October 2004, the Lebanese security sector has been tested by a campaign of targeted political assassinations and bombings that has increased the sense of insecurity of the general population and eroded its confidence in the ability of the state to prevent, counter and investigate acts of violence. The failure to identify and bring to courts perpetrators has exposed the weakness of the intelligence, investigative and judicial services. Those assassinations and bombings have also increased the reliance of targeted individuals and entities on private security providers. In an attempt to allay the fears of the population, the security agencies have increased their visibility by setting up
checkpoints and cordoning off sensitive areas of Beirut, with the adverse effect of creating an unsettling sense of siege.

The July 2006 war
The 2006 war opposed Hezbollah to the Israeli Defense Forces, in which the Lebanese army played a minimal role. Despite being targeted by the Israeli Air Force, which took out its coastal radar system, bombed several LAF positions and killed a number of Lebanese soldiers, the LAF stayed out of the fight for several reasons: the imbalance of power was such that defeat and ensuing humiliation were quasi certain, there was no consensus within Lebanese society about the merits of the war, and LAF involvement would have led to the targeting of the Lebanese state and infrastructure as a whole.

In the aftermath of the war, however, and in line with Lebanese commitments and UN resolutions, the LAF sent several brigades in Southern Lebanon, an area it had been absent from for the past 30 years. This deployment was a major effort for an already overstretched force, but enhanced the status of the LAF in the eyes of the population and transformed the strategic picture in the South, with Hezbollah and Israel no longer facing each other.

The 2007 Nahr el-Bared war
The 2007 mini-war that opposed the LAF and Fatah al-Islam, an armed organization of many loyalties, led by Palestinian commanders and composed of jihadi fighters, was the LAF’s first military engagement in 60 years, civil war put aside. If the Lebanese military emerged victorious from three and a half months of urban warfare, the fight was nevertheless bloody (over 170 killed) and instructive, as it exposed the many structural weaknesses that the LAF suffers from, including the acute lack of capabilities, training, coordination, doctrine, intelligence etc.

The Nahr el-Bared war served as a wake-up call for the the LAF leadership, the government and foreign actors and led to increased foreign assistance to the Lebanese
security sector. A key finding was that the LAF could not have sustained the fight without foreign and especially US assistance.

The war also re-opened the debate of the chronic problem of Lebanon’s large and unstable Palestinian camps from which various groups operate. The Lebanese army has pointedly refrained from entering camps since 1969, allowing the free movement of Palestinian and other organizations. Palestinian camps are therefore effectively outside the authority of the Lebanese state, creating so-called security islands and security challenges. The lack of political will inside Lebanon with regards to this issue and the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict guarantee that there will be no lasting solution to this problem and that the squalid living conditions inside the camps will continue to generate instability.

**Border control**

UN resolutions, in particular resolution 1701, demand that Lebanon secure its border with Syria in order to prevent the entry of weaponry. Borders between Lebanon and Syria have historically been porous and the Syrian reluctance to delineate borders and facilitate the monitoring of the movement of goods and people only exacerbate the problem. The Syrian and Hezbollah opposition to the deployment of international forces to deploy along the border has put the burden on the Lebanese security sector, which is ill-designed and equipped to perform this mission satisfactorily, and is politically constrained as illustrated by instances in which weaponry seized by security forces is returned to Hezbollah for fear of escalation.
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To assist the Lebanese authorities, the UN and the international community have launched a number of projects to delineate the border and establish monitoring capabilities. To this end, the UN sent out an independent team known as the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT), which subsequently issued a report outlining the challenges facing efforts to secure the borders. The findings of that report were as follows:

- The levels of cooperation and coordination, particularly within the interagency and efforts at information sharing, are low;
- Border management is based on territorial defense, rather than border surveillance;
- There is little, if any, interagency cooperation;
- Significant portions of the border with Syria are not demarcated;
- Experience, capability and capacity to conduct border operations are low;
- There is little or no coordination with Syrian counterparts;
- People living in border areas are heavily dependent upon smuggling for their livelihoods;
- The present state of border management is insufficient to prevent any smuggling, particularly the smuggling of arms;
- The political will does exist to improve border management.

The Border Assessment Team then initiated a German-led border pilot project at the northern border, with the goal to create a common border force that could deploy in a later stage on the eastern border. The main objectives of the Border Assessment Team are to encourage the LAF, the ISF, Customs and General Security to work together and to train them on border control and border management. In practice, its main focus has been on intelligence-led joint border operations. Evidence of success has been in enhanced capacity and capability in mobility, communications and command and control.

**The current state of the Lebanese security sector**

Any discussion about security sector reform in Lebanon must start with an assessment of the current state of the security sector. The 1989 Taef Agreement that put an end to the civil war attempted to reform in depth the security sector, but Syrian hegemony and
sectarian politics prevented the implementation of the reforms envisaged. The Lebanese military, while busy rebuilding itself after collapsing in the 1980s, also became a patronage network and a political instrument in the service of parochial and political interests. Conference participants did not provide a technical security assessment, but offered insights into the politics and workings of the security agencies.

**Description of the main Lebanese security agencies**

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a 35,000-strong force with limited capabilities and extensive mandate, is headed by the army commander, supported by the military council and the joint staff. It reports to the Council of Ministers through the Defense Minister. The Army commander serves as the key military adviser of the government and sits on the Higher Defense Council, the key policymaking body in charge of defense matters. The LAF budget has consistently amounted to less than 5% of the national budget. 90% of the national defense budget is for personnel, including salaries, benefits, medical services, and perks for officers, leaving less than 5% to equipment, training and operations, preventing the LAF from modernizing and operating properly.

The Internal Security Forces (ISF) is nominally the agency in charge of internal security, tasked with maintaining public order and security, protecting people and property, and preserving civil rights and freedom. It is also responsible for assisting public authorities as needed, and protecting public administration facilities and diplomatic missions. Additionally, the judicial police supports the law by executing charges, judicial judgments and warrants. The ISF is currently 24,000 strong with a full capacity of 28,000 soldier and reports to the Ministry of Interior. The most important units within the ISF are the territorial gendarmerie, the judiciary police, the police of Beirut, the mobile
battalion and the police academy. The ISF has recently added an intelligence branch to provide additional counterterrorism and investigative capacity. The ISF, despite its rapid if ill-designed growth, plays a support role to the LAF and suffers from severe image problems.

_Credibility of the LAF_

The Lebanese public generally views the LAF as the only reliable and competent national institution. Despite the fact that the army is structurally weak, a recent public opinion poll stated that 60% of the people would prefer temporary military rule, primarily because of the army’s perceived level of professionalism and lack of sectarian coloring, particularly in contrast to the other security institutions. For example, the recent deployment of the army to the south was warmly welcomed by the local population and has allowed a gradual if still timid return of the state.

_Politics of the LAF_

The LAF’s credibility stems from the perception that it remains above all internal political bickering and is not affected by sectarianism. This perception is strengthened by the fact that military personnel are not allowed to vote in parliamentary and mayoral elections. Additionally, the military leadership is keen on preserving good relations with all Lebanese political parties and factions, including Hezbollah and the Palestinians.

Remainingapolitical is however very difficult given the current divisions inside Lebanon. Panelists viewed the army as a reflection of Lebanese society itself, as the country’s problems are inherently political. Although there was agreement that the army is indeed united and capable of maintaining cohesion during times of war, there is a fear that many Shiites in the military have favorable feelings towards Hezbollah and would leave or stir up trouble within their institutions if asked.

_Challenges of the ISF_

After the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, the Lebanese government began investing in the ISF and envisioned its mission expanding from maintaining the public order to also
include conducting criminal investigations and performing counterterrorism activities. The demonstrations, bombings and political assassinations of the past few years illustrate the need for such a strong and capable internal security force.

The build-up of the ISF is marred by a host of problems. In order to increase the ISF’s capacity in counterterrorism, officers were sent abroad for training. However, they still do not have the necessary equipment to fight these new threats. Also, training for recruits has been lacking in substance and rigor, affecting the credibility and perception of the force. Further complications include the ISF’s recently formed intelligence arm, created to support these news missions. The ISF problems reflect the wider challenge of security reform: obstacles to its effectiveness range from technical problems to overlapping and competing missions with other Lebanese intelligence services, and political interference.

In general, ISF has proved unable to effectively carry out its missions without support from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). A recent and glaring example of its lack of capacity was during the conflict at Nahr el-Bared, when it served as a surrogate to the LAF to defeat Fatah al-Islam.

**Intelligence Services**

The intelligence services’ post-2005 performances have been less than satisfactory, as exemplified by their inability to prevent any of the assassinations and explosions that have rocked Lebanon or identify those responsible for the violence. Structurally, the intelligence services are weak due to overlapping and contradicting missions and have been penetrated due to poor procedures and lack of professionalism.

The Directorate of Intelligence of the LAF is considered to be the most experienced and capable in Lebanon because of its use of the local population as source of information. Its effectiveness is tied to the credibility of the LAF as an institution, as people generally trust the army with which they are willing to share information. Furthermore, the LAF has proven able to quickly transmit collected intelligence through the chain of command to Beirut. No other intelligence agency has shown comparable efficacy.
Problems do exist, however. The mission of LAF intelligence, which is officially in charge of military intelligence, is to protect the personnel and institutions of the LAF, as provisioned by the Taef Agreement. But both during and after the Syrian occupation, it has been simultaneously conducting national, tactical, strategic, political and military intelligence, with a significant focus on domestic affairs. Without a framework defining the roles and missions of the different intelligence services, military intelligence has often competed and interfered with the work of the other services.

Interagency cooperation
One of the common themes throughout the discussion was the difficulty the Lebanese Armed Forces have in coordinating with other institutions and agreeing on integrated operations and command, particularly during national emergencies. The fighting at Nahr el-Bared forced the LAF and the ISF to form a Joint Operations Center, which brought delegates from the ISF, LAF, state security and General Security together. But army headquarters discovered after the battle that there was poor communication between that center, headquarters, and the ISF. While this center is currently operating and helps to “prevent surprises,” the panelists conceded enduring communications problems among the security services.

UNIFIL’s experience with the security agencies was more damning: a panelist with UN background argued that there is absolutely no cooperation, communication and coordination among the agencies and that no joint operations are conducted. This is why UNIFIL has been working exclusively with the LAF since 1978. UNIFIL currently lacks any functional relationship with the ISF.

Recruitment
Recruitment continues to be a major challenge for the Lebanese security sector. Agencies currently lack proper procedures for vetting recruits before they are accepted into the service, allowing the penetration of the force by various political actors. There is great concern that although soldiers pledge allegiance to these institutions, their real loyalty
may lie with their respective political leaders, thus creating a situation which could destabilize the army internally. Demographic balance is another concern. In recent years, the largest demographic interested in joining the army has been the Shiites, with very few Christians interested in joining at all. For example, the ISF recently accepted 5,000 new recruits, but did not monitor the demographics of the group to fend off criticism that it was not respecting the sectarian balance. The current balance within the armed forces is 65-68% Muslim and 32-33% Christian. It is closer to 50-50% in the officers’ corps.

The Role of UNIFIL
UNIFIL’s mandate since 1978, when it was formed in response to the Israeli invasion, is to assist the Lebanese state in restoring the state’s authority in the south, although at the time the collapsing Lebanese state could not even control the capital. This resulted in UNIFIL assuming roles and duties that it was not necessarily mandated to do.

The attempts to deploy the LAF in the South have repeatedly failed due to Syrian and Hezbollahi opposition. In 1996, after the Grapes of Wrath operation, Prime Minister Hariri announced that 15,000 LAF troops would be sent to assist UNIFIL, but Syria blocked his plan. In 2000, Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon, but despite pressure from the UN Security Council and the United States, the LAF was once again prevented from deploying. The few soldiers posted in the south played an insignificant role given restrictions on their movement and the lack of a mandate to affirm state authority. For example, they refused to approach the border alone and instead traveled in UNIFIL vehicles to perform border inspections and monitor the demarcation process.
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Today, however there is a different situation in Lebanon and a very different UNIFIL. The LAF is now deployed in the south, alongside a beefed-up UNIFIL. The mission has changed: UNIFIL is now tasked with supporting the army, with a restrictive mandate. For example, UNIFIL is not allowed to seize weapons caches, but must alert the LAF of their locations. But the UN made LAF presence on the border a prerequisite for its continued and increased support. It has an important training function as well, including working to strengthen the Lebanese Navy.

During the discussion, the concern was raised that the presence of UNIFIL, while crucial at this point in providing stability, can also have the adverse effect of preventing Lebanon from taking full responsibility for its security – particularly in the case of Lebanon where UNIFIL has been in place for decades.

The Evolution of UNIFIL

UNIFIL was established 1978 as a buffer force between Israel and Palestinian groups, and then later Lebanese groups opposed to Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon.

The initial mandate stated that UNIFIL would exist "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." Throughout the Lebanese civil war, however, the inability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to effectively control Southern Lebanon required UNIFIL to act outside the provisions of its original mandate.

In the wake of the 2006 summer war, the UN expanded both the size and scope of UNIFIL’s mandate. UNSCR 1701 expanded its size to 15,000 troops and empowered it to "take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as its deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties."

What is needed to improve capacity and performance?

Since gaining independence from Syria in 2005, several challenges including the March 8 and 14 demonstrations, the July 2006 war with Israel and the events of Nahr el-Bared have served to illustrate the limited capacity of the security services at the tactical and strategic levels. Although the victory at Nahr el-Bared has come to be seen as a "coming-of-age" moment for a newly independent army, it was also a Phyrre victory, leaving the force bruised, battered and unable to face a similar threat in the future without drastic improvement and changes.

The Lebanese political situation remains extremely volatile. At the time of the conference, Lebanon was facing its most serious political standoff since the end of the civil war and had no president. Threats to national security have not abated, only increased, and the
risk of further violence endures. Conference participants noted that while Lebanon’s political and strategic challenges may take considerable time to resolve, the armed forces must immediately be made ready and equipped to effectively meet these future threats.

The army’s overstretched capacity and equipment have recently been pushed to the limit. For example, in Nahr el-Bared the fighters of Fatah al-Islam were equipped with the most advanced sniper rifles – weapons that the LAF’s issued rifles could not compete with. The panelists argued that had the army been equipped with better weapons systems, including helicopters, smart bombs, anti-tank rockets and missiles, field computer technology, and night vision binoculars and snipers, victory over the militia would have been achieved faster and at a lesser human cost.

The army’s most dire challenge is its lack of fundamental systems and supplies. In Nahr el-Bared, the army did not have an adequate communications network, forcing soldiers to rely on their own personal cell phones to communicate. The panelists also emphasized the urgent need for basic equipment for all troops, including tents, sleeping bags, jackets and boots, life support systems and diesel fuel. Without these essentials, not only does the performance of the troops suffer, but so do their morale and credibility, already under tremendous pressure.

In addition to equipment, other pressing needs include an improvement of proper basic training for all soldiers and police, and appropriate and specialized training for those requiring special expertise. To highlight the training deficiencies and lack of professionalization within the ISF, one of the panelists described a common scenario in Beirut: an ISF police officer who, rather than monitoring the checkpoint to which he is assigned, is consistently seen playing games and talking on his cell phone. This panelist emphasized that not only does this demonstrate a lack of training and emphasis on professionalism by the ISF, but it also serves to explain why the Lebanese population does not take pride in and trust the ISF as an institution. In order to create an effective police force, one must first make them look and act like police. With that behavior
comes credibility and respect from the population they are serving – fundamentals that no level of equipment can provide.

On the issue of the borders, particularly the shared border between Lebanon and Syria, proper monitoring and securing of that border requires political will, not only from the Syrian government but from the Lebanese government as well. But in the absence of such a political decision, work is still being done to improve the situation. One of the main lessons taken from the initial efforts at establishing a Lebanese Common Border Force is that some of the current and future tactical and strategic decisions made in respect to the border will have negative effects on the local population associated with them. To mitigate such consequences and avoid a backlash, an incremental, development-based approach to border management from the outset is necessary. What should be done immediately is an accurate assessment of the costs associated with closing a border on surrounding communities and a feedback mechanism. This can be achieved in the absence of political decisions from Beirut and Damascus.

**Thinking Bigger – Comprehensive Security Sector Reform**

The lack of a national consensus about the identity and future direction of Lebanon has profound implications for the development and consolidation of the Lebanese security sector. Above all, the absence of a national security strategy that addresses the security needs and designs a security architecture for the country undermine the efficacy and sustainability of any domestic or foreign security assistance project. Nevertheless, the acute security challenges faced by Lebanon require short- and medium-term initiatives to improve the overall performance of the security sector from domestic security to fighting ability.

Central to any viable security sector reform enterprise, however, is a keen understanding of the politics and dynamics of security in Lebanon as well as inscribing it within a larger state-building effort. This will require designing a new security architecture that defines security more broadly than a focus on the immediate physical security of the state, strengthening civilian oversight of the security sector, better defining missions and
division of labor and resources, serious efforts at defense planning and budget, and improving the internal management of security agencies.

According to a panelist, one of the biggest challenges to security sector reform in Lebanon is the disconnect between civilian bodies tasked with oversight and the armed forces. In looking at the structure of the security sector, one can see that it is, as this individual put it, “lopsided.” The Ministry of Interior has control over two of the most powerful security services, the Internal Security Forces and the General Security. The Ministry of Defense works closely with the army, the Higher Defense Council plays a role in defense issues and finally the Parliamentary committee has budget control and oversight. But in reality, these civilian institutions have little actual control over the security forces. The situation is such that, for example, very few members of Parliament on the Defense Committee are even aware of what the defense budget is. And even those that are informed about the budget might not know how the budget is spent or who the relevant decision-makers are. As the panelist put it, “democratic oversight is ambiguous in Lebanon.”

Another issue is that high-ranking politically appointed personnel within the armed services do not take orders from the army commander, but rather follow orders from the political leadership responsible for their appointment. There is no institutionalized accountability for such high-level positions.

In the absence of effective civilian oversight, the military officers have established strong internal corrective mechanisms. Officers and soldiers feel accountable to their institutions and the enforcement of orders follows a strong chain of command. This contributes to the professionalism of the army and is another source of public confidence in them as an institution.

**Past attempts at civilian oversight and reform**

During the discussion, a few anecdotes were shared in order to illustrate the challenges facing current civil-military relations in Lebanon. One such story was that at one point,
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the Ministry of Interior attempted to build a central computer terminal for intelligence gathering and sharing among all of the intelligence services. In a symbolic act, the head of the General Security, who was appointed by the opposition, refused to turn over his service’s computers. As a result, the Ministry of Interior was forced to drop the initiative.

Another story recounted a scandal a few years ago, which implicated the security services in eavesdropping on Lebanese politicians, including the prime minister. As a result, the heads of the security services were brought to Parliament to testify. But then the story dropped unexpectedly from the press and there was never any public resolution of the issue.

A National Security Council

The idea of establishing a National Security Council-like institution was raised as a possible solution to some of the issues affecting the security sector. Modeled after the US NSC but tailored to fit the Lebanese system, it would be staffed by multi-confessional representatives from both civilian and military institutions and would act as a buffer between security and politics as well as a way to institutionalize security work.

To be successful, a requirement of this NSC would be, naturally, political consensus and will. Consensus in Lebanon is however so difficult to achieve that there were dissenting opinions among the panelists about whether an NSC would actually be beneficial. Those in disagreement believed that given the current political environment, the proposed NSC would not only be ineffective, but by making the army accountable to civilian and political oversight, the new structure would run the risk of politicizing the army and losing the only credible national institution that the country can currently rely on. In their eyes, there is currently a evident difference between the values, ethics and credibility of the military and politicians that is worth preserving. Furthermore, many felt that the same issues that affect Lebanese institutions are likely to also affect such an organ, therefore burdening it with similar difficulties. A related question is whether the leadership of the NSC will also be determined on a sectarian basis and how this would impact security operations and sharing of information and intelligence with other security actors. A
parallel was made between this proposed NSC-like institution and the one that was set up by the Palestinian Authority, which became just another body that political groups fought over. Furthermore, without committed political leadership and consensus, it becomes impossible to build such an institution. Some panelists argued that rather than create another layer of bureaucracy, Lebanon should move away from politicization through staff colleges, increased exchanges and the professionalization of Lebanese security policy.

Other panelists expressed the hope that a new president and leadership would be able to amend the necessary laws in order to create such an institution and appoint a reliable figure to serve as its head. The council would then report directly to the president.

**Improving the rule of law and the justice system**

The performance of the security sector depends to a large extent on the performance of other institutions, including the judiciary, which suffers from a lack of resources and capabilities as well as political interference. For example, while investigative judges are always the first to arrive at each crime scene, there is no systematic forensic or criminal investigative training.

Another issue is the exclusive reliance of military courts for all matters involving military personnel. Security reform should therefore include a revision of military justice and make security personnel subject to civilian justice in most cases.

**Empowering Parliament**

One panelist argued that “parliament is the best guarantor against sectarian influence, abuse of power and corruption.” Therefore, to improve civilian accountability of the security services, the Lebanese Parliament needs to be empowered and more control mechanisms must be created.

Another panelist dissented, arguing that before civilian oversight is strengthened, the politicians themselves should face increased accountability and oversight. The army has
received extensive training in democratic values and lives up to high ethical standards, as evidenced by the strong popular support that it receives. The politicians do not.

**Sectarianism within security agencies**

Another issue within the security sector is the political use of sectarianism to push for specific agendas, policies or people. For example, the ISF has been tainted by the accusation that it has become the army of the Sunnis due to its association with the Ministry of Interior, despite the fact that Sunnis are in the minority within that service. Such labels are demoralizing for the members of the security services and serve to only widen the rift between them and the Lebanese public.

**Role of civil society and think tanks**

Lebanon enjoys a more open security culture than most Arab states thanks to an active civil society and a vibrant media. But the security establishment has remained distrustful and unreceptive to the entry of civil society into the security realm. The perception that think tanks cannot be effective or should be allowed to have a say in security matters has prevented policymakers from reaching out or listening to civil society recommendations. Rather, those matters are only discussed in small circles of elites and senior politicians.

However, the recent experience of the non-partisan national electoral commission suggests that the system may be opening up to non-government analysts, including those with security and defense credentials. Their expertise and input can help offset the weight of sectarian politics and nepotism, and contribute to improving the overall effectiveness of the security sector.

**What role can and does foreign assistance play in the Lebanese security sector?**

Lebanon has historically received foreign assistance from a number of different states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Most of this assistance was limited to officer training. From 1990 through 1994, all foreign assistance programs to Lebanon were frozen, leaving Syria as the only available source for security
assistance. As a result, the LAF’s equipment and capabilities deteriorated, as the army chronically under-funded and under-supplied, receiving mainly second-hand Soviet equipment.

The situation changed again in 1994 when several countries, including the United States, restarted their security assistance programs. It was shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and Lebanon quickly benefited from the resulting equipment surplus. Although much of this surplus was in poor condition, often with few or no spare parts, it was badly needed. Much of this equipment is currently still in use and requires critical upgrades in terms of surplus parts and repairs.

Since 2006, foreign security assistance to Lebanon has picked up in quantity and quality. As an example, today the ISF receives assistance from the U.S., France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Australia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. The U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement recently allocated $60 million to the ISF to provide better training and equipment to ISF personnel; Saudi Arabia donated $35 million for equipment, weapons and modern forensic facilities; and cooperation with Interpol and other regional and international bodies has dramatically improved.

Lebanon, like all recipient countries, recognizes that foreign assistance is inherently political and depends on the donor party’s priorities. For example, total U.S. assistance to Lebanon in 1990 was around $1 million but in 2007 the U.S. promised the country $270 million, which included assurances of advanced weaponry. At the outset, conference participants warned against politicizing the aid that the U.S. gives to Lebanon and expressed the hope that the assistance package would focus on the country’s true needs, not on the donor state’s preferences. An example of failed foreign assistance due to the fragmentation and lack of coordination of foreign assistance was when Lebanon received equipment and assistance to build state-of-the-art laboratories for the ISF. In the end, the laboratories could not be used, as the equipment sent consisted of unequal amounts of materials, with some essential items missing altogether. Another concern raised regarding the $270 million in U.S. assistance was the capacity of the Lebanese armed forces to absorb such a large amount of money and resources. But the major fear is that
foreign assistance would be portrayed and perceived as supporting a specific partisan agenda instead of being part of a state-building endeavor.

The panelists agreed that current foreign aid should address the most urgent needs of the Lebanese security sector – basic necessities for both the soldiers and their operations. This includes diesel fuel, boots, tents, and sleeping bags, as well as spare parts for the post-Vietnam helicopters and other equipment that the armed forces are operating. It was mentioned that in comparison to UNIFIL troops, who are housed in air-conditioned containers, LAF soldiers are not even provided with tents. The lack of these fundamentals hinders the ability for both the soldiers and the Lebanese public to believe in their institutions. Only once these basic needs are met should the assistance transition to more sophisticated weaponry.

One of the United States’ most common forms of assistance is officer training. But the participants raised the issue of balance. They believe that certain sectors of the armed forces have been over-trained, while others are still in deep need of it. Officers, for example, have been consistently participating in US training programs, but very little has traditionally been done for recruits. The real need is platoon-level training, similar to the programs that the U.S. used to run in 1982-1983. US military officials in attendance confirmed that such a comprehensive training program is indeed in development. Currently, the focus is on assisting Lebanese special operations forces; this program is currently being expanded to include conventional forces as well. The officials indicated, however, that this training would be conducted by contractors rather than the US military due to political sensitivity.

Another U.S. officer also noted that a significant portion of the promised U.S. foreign assistance to Lebanon would include training programs geared towards the entire military, from privates to senior staff. Additionally, funding will go to developing a training infrastructure as well as assisting the creation of a defense strategy that acknowledges lack of a national security strategy but focuses on defining goals and missions for the military. Lebanese participants emphasized that while the Pentagon does send officers to Lebanon on advisory and training missions, the importance of letting the Lebanese set the tone and content of the training and of acknowledging political sensitivities is paramount.
The European Union’s security reform program was mentioned as a highly regarded program, one that could assist Lebanon in establishing and maintaining budget control, transparency, policing and management systems and in helping launch a public awareness campaign to change the image of the security services within Lebanon.

In the end, the panelists emphasized credibility. No one believes that Lebanon can and should develop military capabilities intended to directly confront Israel, but Lebanese cannot resign themselves to being “pushed around.” The needs of the armed forces boil down to dignity. The Lebanese Navy may not be able to fight high-tech Israeli ships, but they should at least be equipped gunboats and fast boats so that they are able to patrol their own coastline. The Lebanese people do not dream of defeating the Israeli military, but rather want to trust that their own army has what it needs to prevent it from breaking apart or crumbling over time.

**Conclusion**

Of the many themes running through the workshop, the strongest was the realization that any success of the Lebanese security sector is dependent on the crafting of a national security strategy and that true and comprehensive security sector reform requires independence, peace and stability. According to the panelists, although there is a deep and urgent need for a national security strategy, the entrenched divisions within Lebanese society currently make it incredibly difficult to agree on a common vision for the state. This subsequently makes the establishment of a national strategy almost impossible. Additionally, Lebanon today still does not enjoy peace and freedom from foreign influence, which prevents the creation of the political space needed to conduct extensive reforms.

**SSR Requires Peace**

To the panelists, it is clear that security sector reform was impossible during the thirty years of Syrian occupation. But since 2005, Lebanon has faced several serious security challenges, including the 2006 war with Israel and the conflict in Nahr el-Bared which
Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform

have also made it impossible for the Lebanese government and security sector to focus on a comprehensive and honest reform process.

**Continued External Influences**

Although Syria physically withdrew from Lebanese territory in 2005, its influence remains considerable. Its presence, along with that of Iran, can be felt primarily as exercised through its intelligence assets, sympathetic politicians, Hezbollah and factions within the Palestinian community. In addition to these two states, Lebanon is also influenced by the policies and preferences of the United States. One of the panelists described the choice facing Lebanon as not between independence and accepting the influence of an outside actor, but rather the choice between two sets of actors – the axis of Syria and Iran or the axis of the United States and Israel.

**A National Political Dialogue**

In order to resolve some of the enduring challenges of the security sector, which is very much a reflection of the challenges of Lebanese society itself, the country must launch a national political dialogue under the auspices of a new president. Consensus must be reached on a number of key issues, including: better implementation of the Taef Agreement; a national security policy that defines the country’s threats and allies; a national defense strategy which establishes an authority to manage and coordinate among the various security services; and arguably most importantly, the identity of Lebanon itself.

**In the meantime, what do we do?**

Thorough reform of the security sector may not happen without first agreeing on a national security strategy. Regardless, however, of whether progress on that front is achieved, there are continued threats to Lebanon’s security that require its security institutions to be capable of an effective response. It will be up to the next president, government and parliament of Lebanon to work towards that goal, but much can be done in the meantime, on the tactical level and within institutions, to strengthen the capacity and improve the performance of the security sector.
The perception of a competent security sector is an essential component of state building and consolidation of state authority. Some changes, modest in light of the formidable challenge of security reform, can do much in that regard: professionalization of the police force so that it is better able to maintain law and order, earn the respect of the population and better assist the LAF in providing internal security; improvement of border management; supply of the armed forces with basic items and training that will increase their capacity and morale and conventional weaponry superior to those of non-state actors who undermine the state’s authority and credibility.
APPENDIX A:
Appendix C:

ISF
Internal Security Force

**Mission**
Law No.17, September 6th, 1990

The ISF is defined as a public armed forces whose jurisdiction covers all Lebanese territory, territorial waters, and air space.

**The Administrative police:**
- Keep order and security
- Protect people and properties
- Assure the execution of law and legal rules
- Protect freedom within the limits of public law

**The Judicial police:**
- Execute charges and rogatory letters
- Execute judicial judgments and warrants
- Achieve the missions of the judicial police

**Other fields:**
- Support the public authorities in carrying out assigned duties
- Guard the public administration
- Guard and administrate prisons when requested
- Guard diplomatic missions in Lebanon

From http://www.isf.gov.lb/English/Menu/General+Info/Missions/

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**Organizational Structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Director</td>
<td>Major General Ashraf Riffi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gendarmerie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Branch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Security and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Force Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From The Military Balance 2007, International Institute for Strategic Studies

---

**Budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>413bLL/$275m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2% of GDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget represents all offices and programs that fall under the title of Public Order and Safety Affairs.

From the Lebanese Ministry of Finance
LAF
Lebanese Armed Forces

Mission
Specified in National Defense Act
Decree Law no. 102 September 16, 1983

Face the Israeli occupation and its perpetual
aggression in South Lebanon and West
Bekaa and support the steadfastness of
Lebanese citizens to ensure the complete
withdrawal of the Israeli forces to interna-
tionally recognized borders

Defend the country and its citizens against all
aggression

Confront all threats against the country’s
vital interests

Coordinate with Arab armies in accordance
with ratified treaties and agreements

Maintain internal security and stability

Engage in social and development activities
according to national interests

Undertake relief operations in coordination
with other public and humanitarian
institutions

Organizational Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander-in-Chief</th>
<th>General Michel Suleiman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of staff</td>
<td>Major General P.S.C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shawki Al Masri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chiefs of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Tanks 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel 1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery 541</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel 1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and Combat 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Aircraft 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Helicopters 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility Helicopters 35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>$531 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Approximately 2.9% of GDP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From The Military Balance 2007 International Institute for Strategic Studies
Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects for security sector reform

General Security

Mission

Security
Collect, evaluate, and analyze political, economic and social information for the government
Fight elements that endanger security by prosecuting acts of sabotage and those who jeopardize security
Participate in judicial investigations dealing with offenses committed against the security of the state
Supervise the preparation and implementation of security measures
Fight banned parties and prohibited associations
Prepare wanted notices and prosecutions related to wanted persons
Escort Lebanese statesmen

Media
Ensure the implementation of laws and rules related to the censorship of media and information

Immigration Services
Issue Lebanese passports
Issue entry visas
Provide facilities required by foreigners for the delegations, missions, invitations and meetings of Arab and foreign visitors
Control entry and exit from the country by foreigners, including their residence, their departure, and their movements to ensure their security
Prepare the correspondence related to deportations and incidents including breaches of security, traveling bans, and entry restrictions
Deliver permanent and temporary residence permits
Organize and deliver travel documents for Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon or coming from foreign countries
Supervise all procedures related to personal statute and naturalization applications
Deliver transit permits

Organizational Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional General Security Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force Strength

| Force Strength | Personnel | 3,600 |

From The Military Balance 2007, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget represents all offices and programs that fall under the title of Public Order and Safety Affairs.

From the Lebanese Ministry of Finance
UNIFIL

Location: Southern Lebanon
Headquarters: Naqoura
Duration: March 1978 to present
Force Commander: Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Strength

Authorized [S/RES/1701 of 11 August 2006]:
15,000 troops, supported by international and local civilian staff

Current (31 October 2007)
13,264 military personnel, supported by some 298 international civilian and 571 local civilian staff

Note: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 30 September 2007

Contributors of military personnel:
Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

Fatalities

257 troops
2 military observers
4 international civilian staff
4 local staff

267 Total

Financial Aspects

Method of financing
Assessments in respect of a Special Account

Approved budget:
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: $748.20 million
(A/C.5/61/23)

Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
© United Nations 2007
Appendix: D:
Examples of Foreign Assistance

### LAF Foreign Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **USA** | 2007 military assistance package: $220 Million  
- 285 new High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), plus spare parts  
- Financial support to buy 24 5-ton trucks  
- Financial support to repair 23 UH-1H and 4 AB-212 helicopters  
- 3 TA-3 Skywarriors (Pledged but yet to be delivered) |
| **Canada** | 2006-2008: $10 million (To Lebanon Relief Fund)  
- 4 Patrol Boats |
| **Belgium** | 45 German-built Leopard-1 tanks (Pledged but not delivered)  
- 24 M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer guns (Pledged but not delivered)  
- 70 armored personnel carriers (Pledged but not delivered) |
| **UK** | 50 new Land Rover utility vehicles |
| **UAE** | 9 Gazelle helicopter gunships  
- 5 10-meter & 5 14-meter patrol craft |
| **Germany** | 1 20-meter & 1 34-meter coastal patrol boats  
- 6 naval radar systems |
| **Syria** | Parts and ammo for T-54/55 tanks  
- Parts, ammo, and 130mm artillery batteries  
- Diesel fuel |

This list is not comprehensive and is based on press reports and other publicly available material. It does not include training and other types of assistance and expertise made available to Lebanese institutions by foreign actors.
Examples of ISF Foreign Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>In 2007 • $60 million to train and equip the Lebanese ISF, particularly in the south and along the border with Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait &amp; Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>• 250 new vehicles and spare parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, Britain, Spain and Italy</td>
<td>• Accepts four to five trainees every month for training in police procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>• $100 million over 2006-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>• $20 million for border patrol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list is not comprehensive and is based on press reports and other publicly-available material. It does not include training and other types of assistance and expertise made available to Lebanese institutions by foreign actors.
APPENDIX E:

LAF Timeline

1990 - Reunification of Army begins.

1991 - The National Assembly orders the dissolution of all militias by 30 April but Hezbollah is allowed to remain active and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) refuses to disband. LAF deploys in Beirut and then gradually everywhere.

1991 22 May - A Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination is signed in Damascus by Lebanon and Syria and a Higher Council, co-chaired by their two presidents, is established.

1991 1 July - The Lebanese army defeats the PLO in Sidon so that it now confronts the Israelis and the SLA in Jazzin, north of the so-called "security zone".

1991 2 September – Lebanon and Syria sign a defense and security pact, ensuring day-to-day coordination on military and security issues, intelligence sharing, and agreements on fugitive extraditions.

1993 25 July - Israel attempts to end the threat from Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in southern Lebanon by launching "Operation Accountability", the heaviest attack since 1982.

1996 18 April – Israel conducts “Operation Grates of Wrath”

1996 26 April – Israel and Lebanon negotiate the “April Understanding” and cease-fire, where it was agreed that both sides would not target civilians or launch attacks from civilian areas. Additionally, a Monitoring Group was set up, consisting of the U.S., France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, to oversee the Understanding.

2000 January – Army launches attack against militant group in Denniyeh

2000 24 May - After the collapse of the SLA and the rapid advance of Hezbollah forces, Israel withdraws its troops from southern Lebanon. The Government deploys a joint force of over 1,000 police and soldiers to the south.

2004 September - UN Security Council resolution 1559 demands that foreign troops leave Lebanon and that all militias be disbanded

2005 April - Syria says its forces have left Lebanon, as demanded by the UN.

2005 July - Lebanese PM Siniora meets Syria's President Assad; both sides agree to rebuild relations.

2006 July - Israel launches air and sea attacks on targets in Lebanon after Lebanon's militant Hezbollah group captures two Israeli soldiers. Civilian casualties are high and the damage to civilian infrastructure wide-ranging. Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced. In August Israeli ground troops thrust into southern Lebanon.
2006 August - Truce between Israel and Hezbollah comes into effect on 14 August after 34 days of fighting and the deaths of around 1,000 Lebanese - mostly civilians - and 159 Israelis, mainly soldiers. A UN peacekeeping force, expected to consist of 15,000 foreign troops, begins to deploy along the southern border.

2006 September - Lebanese Armed Forces deploy along the Israeli border for the first time in decades.

2007 May-September - Siege of the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared following clashes between militants and the military. More than 300 people die and 40,000 residents flee before the army gains control of the camp.
Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform

Appendix F:

President of the Republic

Council of Ministers

Minister of Defense

Chief of Army

Military Council

Chief of Staff

Land Forces

Navy

Air Force

Minister of Interior and Municipalities

Inspector General

Minister of Finance

General Director of the Internal Security Forces

Chief of Staff

Mobile Gendarmerie

Central Administration

Gendarmerie Academy

Chief of Staff

Regional Gendarmerie

Judiciary Police

Beirut Police

Social Services

Directorate of General Security

Embassy Security and Public Administration Facilities Force

Information Branch

Int'l Airport of Rafic Hariri—Beirut Company

Civil Defense

Central Security Council

Regional Security Councils

General Directorate of State Security

Supreme Defense Council

* Based on Lebanese government websites and chart by Dr. Mustapha Abb

KEY:
APPENDIX G:

Resolution 1701 (2006)

The Security Council,


Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons;

Emphasising the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasising the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers;

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel;

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese prime minister and the commitment of the government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a UN force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon;

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest;

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area;

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in south Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from Unifil as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties;
Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict;

Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the government of Lebanon and Unifil as authorised by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. Emphasises the importance of the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon;

4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

   - Full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorised in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

- Full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- No foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- No sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;

- Provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. Invites the secretary general to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be actively involved;

10. Requests the secretary general to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within 30 days;

11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of Unifil to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- a. Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

- b. Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

- c. Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the government of Lebanon and the government of Israel;

- d. Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

- e. Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

- f. Assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;
12. Acting in support of a request from the government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes Unifil to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilised for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. Requests the secretary general urgently to put in place measures to ensure Unifil is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges member states to consider making appropriate contributions to Unifil and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to Unifil in the past;

14. Calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and requests Unifil as authorised in paragraph 11 to assist the government of Lebanon at its request;

15. Decides further that all states shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft;

- **a.** the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, and;
- **b.** the provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above, except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorised by the government of Lebanon or by Unifil as authorised in paragraph 11;

16. Decides to extend the mandate of Unifil until 31 August 2007, and expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. Requests the secretary general to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;
18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Resolution 1559 (2004)

The Security Council,


Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally territorially recognized borders,

Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory,

Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,

Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and underlining the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence,

1. Reaffirms its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon;

2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;

3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;

4. Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;

5. Declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming
presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence;

6. Calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon;

7. Requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and decides to remain actively seized of this matter.
APPENDIX H:

Bibliography


Towards a more secure and stable Lebanon: Prospects for Security Sector Reform

2007


<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64724.htm>.